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Combating terrorism with the alien terrorist 
removal Court
Jonathan H. Yu1
introduCtion
The Alien Terrorist Removal Court (“ATRC”), the United States’ terrorism court, was 
created in 1996 through congressional legislation.2  Although the statutes do not refer to the ATRC 
by this name, the Court’s own rules do, and numerous authorities have used this name frequently.3  
The legislation makes an alien deportation forum available where the government can safely use 
classified evidence against suspected terrorists without exposing national security information.4 
Congress structured the ATRC to balance national security needs with fundamental notions of  due 
process.5 By most measures, the ATRC’s statutory scheme is a legislative success. Even so, the ATRC 
has never heard a case.6
Scholars link the ATRC’s nonuse to questions of  constitutionality.7 This article does not 
address the ATRC’s constitutional status, nor does this article speculate on why the ATRC remains 
dormant. Instead, this article begins with the presumption that terrorist acts have occurred in the 
last two decades, which justify U.S. counterterrorism efforts.8 Based on that presumption, this article 
1 Jonathan H. Yu, J.D., Thomas Jefferson School of  Law, LL.M., The George Washington University Law School, serves 
as an Attorney Advisor with the Executive Officer for Immigration Review, United States Department of  Justice.
The views expressed herein are presented in the author's personal capacity and are the author's alone and do not necessarily 
represent the views of  the Executive Office for Immigration Review or the United States Department of  Justice.
Special thank you goes out to Tomiko Breland for her comments on an early draft of  this article.  I also want to commend 
Vincent Ferraro and his team at the National Security Law Brief  for their hard work and professional attitude.  It has been 
a pleasure working with you all.
2  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531–37 (2012). 
3  See Alien Terrorist Removal Court (“ATRC”) Rule 1 (2012).
4  See Stephanie Cooper Blum, “Use It and Lose It”: An Exploration of  Unused Counterterrorism Laws and Implications for 
Future Counterterrorism Policies, 16 lewis & ClarK l. rev. 677, 682 (2012).
5  See id. at 681; see also Clarence E. Zachery, Jr., The Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures: Removing the Enemy Among Us or 
Becoming the Enemy from Within?, 9 geo. immigr. l. J. 291, 291 (1995).
6  See Blum, supra note 3, at 703.
7  Blum, supra note 3, at 710 (“[T]he fact that many academics and lawmakers believe that [the ATRC’s] provisions 
deprive aliens of  fundamental due process protections may be one reason for its non-use. Other commentators have 
recognized that regardless of  whether the ATRC is unconstitutional, the perception of  its unconstitutionality has 
resulted in its non-use . . . . ‘[I]t may be that constitutional doubts about . . . special court are why the government has 
never used it.’ One scholar goes so far as to suggest that the Attorney General’s failure to invoke the ATRC might 
indicate an effort to avoid an adverse constitutional ruling.”).
8  E.g., FBI 100, First Strike: Global Terror America, fed. bureau of investigation (Feb. 26, 2008), http://www.
fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/february/tradebom_022608 (explaining that on February 26, 1993, Middle Eastern 
terrorists exploded a bomb at the World Trade Center in New York. Six people were killed. More than a thousand 
people were hurt in some way, some badly, with crushed limbs); e.g., The War on Terrorism Remembering the Losses of  
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explores how, with its current make-up, the ATRC is useful for counterterrorism. Furthermore, this 
article examines the ATRC’s robust statutory framework and concludes that the Court provides the 
government with powerful tools against terrorist suspects that are unavailable in any other domestic 
forum. Moreover, due to unique challenges in terrorism prosecutions, scholars have posited separate 
court with special rules should be created for prosecuting terrorist suspects.9 This article contends 
that creating an entirely new court for prosecuting terrorists is unnecessary because the ATRC is 
available to take on that role. 
Part I of  this article gives an overview of  the circumstances leading to the ATRC’s 
creation and parses through its statutory framework.10 Part II explores the ATRC’s usefulness as 
a counterterrorism tool.11 Part III discusses difficulties that occur during terrorism prosecutions 
in criminal courts and explains how the ATRC framework solves those problems.12 Finally, Part 
IV proposes necessary changes to the ATRC’s statutory framework to transform the ATRC into a 
comprehensive terrorist prosecution forum.13
i. baCKground
a. origins of the atrC
The ATRC was born out of  frustration during the Reagan Administration (hereinafter 
KENBOM/TANBOM, fed. bureau of investigation (Aug. 6, 2003), http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2003/august/
kenbom_080603 (noting that on August 7, 1998, nearly simultaneous bombs detonated in front of  the American 
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Two hundred and twenty-four people died in the blasts, 
including twelve Americans. More than 4,500 people were wounded.); e.g.,  Millennium Plot/Ahmed Ressam, fed. bureau 
of investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/millennium-plot-ahmed-ressam (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2015) (saying that on December 14, 1999, Ahmed Ressam, a 34-year-old Algerian, was arrested at Port Angeles, 
Washington attempting to enter the United States with components used to manufacture improvised explosive devices. 
He subsequently admitted that he planned to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on the eve of  the Millennium 
2000 celebrations.); e.g., The USS Cole Bombing, fed. bureau of investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/
famous-cases/uss-cole (last visited Apr. 15, 2015) (stating that on October 12, 2000, suicide terrorists exploded a small 
boat alongside the USS Cole, a Navy Destroyer, as it was refueling in the Yemeni port of  Aden. The blast ripped a 
40-foot-wide hole near the waterline of  the Cole, killing seventeen American sailors and injuring many more.); e.g., 9/11 
Investigation (PENTTBOM), fed. bureau of investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/9-11-
investigation (last visited Apr. 15, 2015) (mentioning that on September 11, 2001, hijackers took control of  four airliners 
and crashed into the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon, and in Stony Creek Township, Pennsylvania. They 
were the most lethal terrorist attacks in history, taking the lives of  3,000 Americans and international citizens). 
9  See generally Ashley Inderfurth & Wayne Massey, Trying Terrorists in Article III Courts, Challenges and Lessons Learned, 
a.b.a. standing Committee on l. and national seCurity, July 2009, available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/natsecurity/trying_terrorists_artIII_report_final.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Stephen I. 
Vladeck, The Case Against National Security Courts, 45 willamette l. rev. 505, 508-16 (2009) (discussing various national 
security court proposals); see also Mark R. Shulman, National Security Courts: Star Chamber or Specialized Justice?, 15 Ilsa J. 
int’l & Comp. l. 533, 543 (2009) (noting that “[t]hese proposals suggest that such a system offers benefits in expediency 
and efficiency and enhanced security for the trial and for its participants and the community in which it is held. They 
also say that national security courts offer a sensible way of  managing the high stakes of  releasing someone who should 
not have been.”).
10  See infra Part I.
11  See infra Part II.
12  See infra Part III.
13  See infra Part VI.
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“Administration”), and took a decade to create.14 In 1987, the Department of  Justice (“DOJ”) 
sought to deport a group of  Palestinians, known as the L.A. Eight, for terrorism activities on 
behalf  of  the Popular Front for the Liberation of  Palestine (“PFLP”).15 The government possessed 
classified evidence implicating the group in an international terrorist conspiracy that involved 
raising funds and distributing literature on behalf  of  the PFLP.16 The DOJ had difficulty with the 
deportation proceedings because at that time, if  the government wanted to use classified evidence 
as the basis for an alien’s deportation, the DOJ was then required to share that information with the 
alien.17 Turning over classified information to the L.A. Eight was an untenable prospect:  it meant 
potentially revealing tightly guarded national security sources and methods to likely terrorists.18 
The notion of  deporting the L.A. Eight forced the government to make a difficult decision. 
On the one hand, the DOJ could pursue the group’s removal and be forced to turn over classified 
information in the process.19 On the other hand, the DOJ might risk the security of  the country if  it 
chose to protect the classified information by dismissing the charges, allowing suspected terrorists to 
remain unmonitored in the country.20 
The Administration realized the choice was unpalatable,21 and responded by proposing 
legislation Professor Stephanie Blum dubbed “a balance between . . . protect[ing] classified 
information and the suspect[s’] . . . ability to defend against the accusations.”22 In 1988, the 
Administration penned the ATRC’s predecessor,23 the Terrorist Alien Removal Act.24 Despite dying 
without hearings in the Senate,25 the legislation was given new life seven years later.26 
The 1993 World Trade Center bombing and murders of  two Central Intelligence Agency 
(“CIA”) employees outside CIA headquarters focused national attention on domestic terrorism,27 
rallying support for the legislation.28 Senator Joseph Biden headed the push.29 He rebranded the 
Terrorist Alien Removal Act as the Alien Terrorism Removal Procedures (“ATRP”), and introduced 
14  Blum, supra note 3, at 680-81.
15  Id.
16  Id.; see 22 U.S.C. § 2378b (2006) (limiting assistance to Hamas controlled Palestinian authority only during a period 
for which a certification is in effect for terrorism ties).
17  Blum, supra note 3, at 680-81.
18  See 141 Cong. Rec. s14,524 (1995) (statement of  Senator Orin Hatch) (“[The] success of  our counter-terrorism 
efforts depends on the effective use of  classified information used to infiltrate foreign terrorist groups. We cannot afford 
to turn over these secrets in open court, jeopardizing both the future success of  these programs and the lives of  those 
who carry them out.”); see also International Terrorism: Threats and Responses: Hearing on H.R. 1710 Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 21 (1995) (statement of  William O. Studeman) (“Foreign governments simply will not confide in us 
if  we cannot keep their secrets. One goal of  [the Terrorism Bill] is to provide a mechanism to do just that by protecting 
classified information in special removal hearings for alien terrorists.”).
19  See John Dorsett Niles, Assessing the Constitutionality of  the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 57 duKe l.J. 1833, 1835 
(2008).
20  Id.
21  Blum, supra note 3, at 681.
22  See id.; see Niles, supra note 18, at 1835-36.
23  See Blum, supra note 3, at 681; see Zachery, supra note 4, at 292.
24  See 139 Cong. Rec. S15,249-01 (1993); see 140 Cong. Rec. S14,534-02 (1994); see 141 Cong. Rec. S1,454-01 (1995).
25  See Zachery, supra note 4, at 292.
26  Id.
27  Id. at 291.
28  See Blum, supra note 3, at 678-89.
29  See The Administration: Vice-President Joe Biden, white house, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/vice-
president-biden (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
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ATRP to Congress under the Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of  1995.30 
With national sentiment on their side, the government pushed the ATRP quickly through 
Congress.31 The Alien Terrorist Removal Court thus materialized in 1996.32 As of  that year, upon 
a judge’s finding that “the continued presence of  the alien . . . would likely cause serious and 
irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious bodily injury to any person,”33 the 
United States is authorized to seek an alien’s deportation using confidential evidence without risk of  
revealing national security information to the suspected terrorist.34 Certainly, if  the ATRC statutory 
framework was available in 1987, the DOJ would have successfully deported the L.A. Eight without 
revealing to them classified information.35 
When Congress passed the ATRC statute, legislators were confident that the Court would 
adjudicate important terrorism cases.36 In a House Report accompanying the ATRC legislation, 
Congress proclaimed, “The removal of  alien terrorists from the U.S., and the prevention of  alien 
terrorists from entering the U.S. in the first place, [are] among the most intractable problems of  
immigration enforcement.”37 To date, Congress’ ambitious legislation has yet to bear fruit. Professor 
Blum framed the ATRC’s actual usage since 1996 succinctly:
                                    38
Therefore, the ATRC’s statutory scheme remains untested.
a. the atrC and its statutory frameworK
The ATRC sits five federal judges for five-year terms, with each appointed by the Chief  
Justice of  the Supreme Court.39 One designee serves as the Chief  Judge.40 The proceedings mirror 
30  S. 390, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995); H.R. 896, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995).
31  Blum, supra note 3, at 681; see Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far Gone?: Due Process and Secret Deportation 
Proceedings, 7 stan. l. & pol’y rev. 23, 25 (1996).
32  See ATRC, supra note 1 (noting the two pieces of  legislation created the ATRC: The Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act [“AEDPA”] of  1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
[“IIRIRA”] of  1996).
33  8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(I) (2012).
34  See Zachery, supra note 4, at 291.
35  See In re Terrorist Bombings of  U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 93, 115 (2d Cir. 2008).
(holding that in a criminal case, the Classified Information Procedures Act [“CIPA”] “establishes rules for the 
management of  criminal cases involving classified information.”); see Blum, supra note 3, at 739 n.9 (comparing the use 
of  classified evidence under the CIPA).
36  See H.R. Rep. No. 104-518, 115 (1996).
37  Id.
38  See Blum, supra note 3, at 692 (internal quotations omitted).
39  See 8 U.S.C. § 1532(c) (2012); see generally, James E. Pfander, The Chief  Justice, the Appointment of  Inferior Officers, 
and the “Court of  Law” Requirement, 107 nw. u. l. rev. 1125 (2013) (discussing the constitutionality of  such 
appointments); see Alien Terrorist Removal Court Members Selected, U. St. Cts. (Sept. 1996), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/
TheThirdBranch/96-09-01/Alien_Terrorist_Removal_Court_Members_Selected.aspx; see 8 U.S.C. §1532(a)-(b) (2012) 
(stating that judges can be designated, after their initial terms, subject to the staggering rule in subjection [b], and  that 
ATRC judges can contemporaneously serve on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court).
40  8 U.S.C. § 1532(c) (2012).
“Despite the passionate rhetoric of  its supporters and its apparent need 
to confront a unique and intractable threat compromising national 
security, the ATRC has never been used, even after the calamities on 
September 11.”
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the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”).41 Congress gave the ATRC specific and 
detailed authority, jurisdiction, and procedures germane to protecting national security and allowing 
a terrorist suspect to present a defense.42 
To help parse through the various authorities, procedures, and protections, this part divides 
the statutory framework under four headings:  (1) Initiating Proceedings, (2) Hearings and Evidence, 
(3) Alien Protections Under the ATRC, and (4) Resolution of  the Case.43
1. initiating proCeedings
To commence proceedings in the ATRC, a DOJ Attorney prepares an ex parte application 
containing a “probable cause statement” which is then filed under seal.44 The statement must 
establish that:  (1) the alien is an alien, (2) is physically present in the U.S., and (3) removal under the 
usual process would pose a risk to the national security of  the U.S.45 A judge decides the merits of  
the application and is allowed to consider “other information, including classified information,”46 
ex parte and in camera. If  the judge finds probable cause,47 he “shall issue an order granting the 
application.”48 If  the judge denies the application, a written statement of  the reasons is required.49 
In contrast, the Attorney General can dismiss the removal case without explanation or appeal any 
application denial directly to the District of  Columbia Circuit.50
2. hearings and evidenCe
After an application is approved, a hearing “must commence expeditiously.”51 With few 
exceptions, the hearings are open to the public.52 Reasonable notice of  the charges detailing the time 
and place of  the hearing must be given to the suspect.53 Unlike in immigration court, 54 an alien in an 
ATRC removal proceeding is entitled to counsel at the government’s expense.55 
Furthermore, the alien is entitled to [limited] discovery, and may introduce evidence at 
the hearing, examine the evidence against him or her, and/or cross-examine any witness(es).56 
41  Id. § 1532(d).
42  See Zachery, supra note 4, at 315 n. 155.
43  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1532-1534 (2012).
44  See 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2), (a)(1)(A)-(D) (stating that the application has four requirements: [1] the name of  the 
applying DOJ attorney, [2] a certification by the Deputy or Attorney General seeking removal of  an alien that classified 
information shows is an alien terrorist, [3] the identity of  the alien for whom removal authorization is sought, and [4] a 
statement of  facts and circumstances to establish probable cause).
45  Id. § 1533(a)(1)(D)(i)-(iii).
46  Id. § 1533(c)(1)(A).
47  See id. § 1533(c)(2) (stating that the judge must find the alien was correctly identified, is an alien terrorist present in 
the U.S., and removal under traditional proceedings would pose a risk to the national security). 
48  Id.
49  See id. § 1533(c)(3) (stating that the judge may not disclose any classified information in the written denial).
50  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b), 1535(a) (2012).
51  See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(1) (2012).
52  See id. § 1534(a)(2).
53  See id. § 1534(b).
54  See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012) (“In any removal proceedings before an immigration judge . . . the person concerned 
shall have the privilege of  being represented [at no expense to the Government] by such counsel, authorized to practice in 
such proceedings, as he shall choose.”) (emphasis added).
55  8 U.S.C. § 1534(c)(1) (2012).
56  See id. § 1534(c)(2)-(3), (e).
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The government has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of  the evidence, that the alien is a 
terrorist subject to removal.57 The Federal Rules of  Evidence are inapplicable.58 The Court may issue 
subpoenas for either party, but the alien cannot use that power to access classified information.59 
In contrast to immigration court, an alien’s protections are subject to three limitations. First, 
the government can use the fruit of  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) authorized 
surveillance and searches against the alien, but the alien is not permitted to access such fruit.”60 
Second, the alien is prohibited from seeking to suppress evidence on the basis that it was unlawfully 
obtained.61 Third, the alien cannot learn the source of  any evidence if  the government determines 
the following:  (1) public disclosure would pose a risk to the national security, (2) the act would 
disclose classified information, or (3) revealing the source would otherwise threaten the integrity 
of  a pending investigation.”62  In practice, these rules would likely prevent a suspect alien terrorist 
access to any government surveillance or informant-based information.
3. alien proteCtions under the atrC
Although an alien’s access to classified evidence is limited, s/he is entitled to an unclassified 
summary of  classified information the government seeks to use against him or her.63 The summary 
process is unique and meticulous. The government submits the classified evidence ex parte for in 
camera review by the judge.64 Concurrently, the government tenders an unclassified summary.65 The 
judge has fifteen days to rule whether the summary is “sufficient to enable the alien to prepare 
a defense.”66 If  the judge disproves the summary, the government has fifteen days to revise and 
resubmit or seek interlocutory appeal.67 
Lawful Permanent Resident (“LPR”) aliens get additional protection.68 First, the judge “shall 
provide for the designation of  a panel of  attorneys.”69 Second, the judge is required to assign a panel 
attorney to review all classified information in camera on behalf  of  the LPR, and that attorney can 
57  See id. § 1534(g).
58  See id. § 1534(h).
59  See id. § 1534(e)(1)(D).
60  See id. § 1534(e)(1)(A) (stating that the alien cannot access information “otherwise collected for national security 
purposes”); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of  1978 Amendments Act of  2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 
2436 (hereinafter “FISA”) (implying that the government can use FISA authorized wiretaps and other data interception 
to build a case against a suspect alien terrorist, and the alien does not have a right to that evidence). 
61  8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1)(B); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3504.
62  8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1)(C). 
63  See id. § 1534(e)(3)(C).
64  See id. § 1534(e)(3)(A).
65  See id. § 1534(e)(3)(B) (stating that the unclassified summary must not pose a risk to national security).
66  See id. § 1534(e)(3)(C).
67  See id. § 1534(e)(3)(D); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1535(b) (2012) (stating that interlocutory appeal is made to the District 
of  Columbia Circuit, and the ATRC judge is the gatekeeper of  classified summary, congruently holding the key to the 
alien’s ability to prepare a defense).
68  See David A. Martin, Graduated Application of  Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of  Zadvydas v. Davis, 
2001 sup. Ct. rev. 47, 108 (2001) (concluding that it is appropriate for the due process claims of  lawful permanent 
residents to rank higher than those of  noncitizens even if  they subjectively think of  the United States as home); see also 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 694 (2001) (recognizing that the nature of  due process protection may vary depending 
upon an alien’s status and circumstance).
69  See 8 U.S.C. § 1532(e) (stating that the panel attorneys are required to have security clearance that allows access to 
the classified information, i.e., Congress intended the ATRC be an adversarial proceeding).
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challenge the veracity of  that classified information.70 Finally, automatic appeal is available if  the 
government used classified evidence without providing a summary.71 
4. resolution of the Case (hearing, deCision, and appeals)
After introducing evidence at the hearing, each party has an opportunity to present 
its arguments “whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the removal of  the alien.”72 Like in 
immigration court, the government presents its case in chief  first.73 The alien has an opportunity to 
reply, and then the government may rebut.74 The judge has discretion to hear any part of  arguments 
pertaining to classified evidence in camera.75 If  the government meets its burden, the judge “shall 
order the alien removed and detained pending removal from the U.S.”76 
Another departure from immigration court is that all decisions must be in writing and 
contain “a statement of  facts found and conclusions of  law.”77 Any part of  the written decision that 
could reveal the “substance or source” of  classified information “shall not” be made public or “made 
available to the alien.”78 
Finally, although an immigration judge can consider various applications for relief  from 
removal during removal proceedings, an ATRC judge may not consider “ancillary relief.”79 After a 
removal decision is made, any party can seek appeal to the District of  Columbia Circuit, and after 
the Circuit, may petition for certiorari from the Supreme Court.80 
The next part of  this article explores using the ATRC as a tool in combating terrorism.
70  See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(F)(i) (2012) (stating that any challenge to the classified evidence is done in camera 
proceeding); see id. § 1534(e)(3)(F)(ii) (stating that if  the special attorney discloses any classified information to the alien 
or to any other attorney representing the alien, the special attorney will be subject to a fine, or minimum prison sentence 
of  ten years, or both). 
71  See 8 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(2) (2012). 
72  See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(f) (2012). 
73  Id. (adding that the alien generally concedes removability in immigration court, and the burden is shifted to the 
alien to establish eligibility for relief). 
74  Id. 
75  Id.
76  8 U.S.C. § 1534(i).
77  Id. § 1534(j). 
78  Id. (emphasis added).
79  An immigration judge’s ability to consider ancillary relief  is likely a major reason the ATRC has not been utilized. 
An immigration judge may only receive classified information from the government which is not revealed to the alien 
when it is considering the forms of  “ancillary relief ” listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1534(k). If  an alien seeks discretionary relief, 
the government can introduce classified evidence. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a), 1227(a) (2012). Otherwise, aliens subject to 
deportation have no right to classified information in immigration court. Hussain v. Gonzales, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 
1036 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956); Hussain v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 739 
(7th Cir. 2007). However, under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012), classified evidence 
is admissible against deportable aliens seeking discretionary relief  without sharing that evidence with the alien. See D. 
Mark Jackson, Exposing Secret Evidence: Eliminating A New Hardship of  U.S. Immigration Policy, 19 buff. pub. int. 
l.J. 25, 40 (2001); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(4)(B) (2012); see also 8 C.F.R. 1240.11(a)(3) (2014). The alien applying for discretionary 
relief  will concede deportability. Then the case becomes about whether notwithstanding being removable, the alien 
warrants relief  from removal to remain in the country. See generally, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11 (2014) (listing various forms for 
relief  from removal). Thus, if  an alien hopes to stay in the country based on ancillary relief, the alien rolls the dice on 
classified evidence submitted by the government opposing relief. 
80  See 8 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(1), (d) (2012).
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ii. the atrC as a Counterterrorism tool
The ATRC statutory framework is an effective counterterrorism tool because the scheme 
allows the government to swiftly remove a suspected terrorist from the country or detain a 
suspected terrorist on immigration charges before he or she can cause harm.81 Since 9/11, 
the United States is committed to foiling domestic terrorist attacks and protecting the nation’s 
security.82 In the spirit of  that commitment, the government should consider using the ATRC as a 
counterterrorism weapon in the “War on Terror.”83 Particularly in situations where criminal grounds 
for detention are unavailable, the ATRC gives the government the ability to remove a national 
security threat from within U.S. borders or detain a suspect on an immigration violation pending 
removal.84
The government has acknowledged its willingness to use the “Capone approach,”85 which 
involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses, 
e.g., immigration violations.86 The following discussion demonstrates that using the ATRC’s statutory 
framework under the Capone approach is superior to using the immigration courts to deport terror 
suspects. A. the atrC removes terrorists effiCiently
The ATRC’s strength is in its simplicity. Adjudication in the ATRC is swift and the ATRC’s 
statutory scheme keeps suspected terrorists off  the streets pending removal.87 By comparison, 
immigration courts are backlogged and adjudicate a variety of  issues throughout a removal case that 
would delay a terrorist’s removal.88 
Removing an alien through immigration court can be a slow process.89 An immigration 
court’s jurisdiction begins when an alien is issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”).90 The NTA contains 
the date and time of  a master calendar hearing and the allegations against the alien.91 At the master 
calendar hearing, the alien pleads to the allegations in the NTA and can apply for various forms of  
81  Id.
82  See Zachery, supra note 4.
83  See Christina Parajon Skinner, Punishing Crimes of  Terror in Article III Courts, 31 yale l. & pol’y rev. 309, 387 (2013) 
(discussing the term “War on Terror”).
84  See id.  
85  Jerome p. bJelopera, Cong. researCh serv., R41780, the federal bureau of investigation and terrorism 
investigations 18-20 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf.
86  Id.
87  Id.
88  Notably, the ATRC is capable of  relieving some of  the immigration court backlog as well. The ATRC was 
intended to handle a small volume of  terrorism and national security immigration cases. See Andrew Becker, Terrorism 
Court Unused 16 Years After Creation, Cal. watCh: publiC safety–daily report (Apr. 12, 2012), http://californiawatch.
org/dailyreport/terrorist-court-unused-16-years-after-creation-14746 (citing DOJ officials as indicating “the court was 
intended to be low volume, as most suspected foreign terrorists can be removed without the use of  classified evidence;” 
in fact, the ATRC employs just five federal district judges—all of  whom have full-time dockets). See id. (quoting Karen 
Redmond, spokeswoman for the Administrative Office of  the U.S. Courts, “[ATRC Judges] are not paid extra for being 
on the court and carry regular caseloads in their respective districts.”). That means the ATRC has the capacity to handle 
the low volume of  national security and terrorism cases that work their way through the immigration courts each year. 
However few, those cases still contribute to the backlog in the immigration court system.
89  See Becker, supra note 88.
90  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15 (2014).
91  Id.
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relief  from removal and seek release on bond.92 The bond hearing is similar to criminal court bond 
hearings and allows the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) to determine if  the alien can be released from 
detention during the pendency of  his or her removal hearing.93 
Notably, with the current backlog of  more than 400,000 cases,94 a case filed in some 
immigration courts in 2014 will not be scheduled for a hearing until 2017.95 Therefore, if  the alien 
secures bond or is released on recognizance, s/he is free to move about the country for several years 
before a removal order is issued. 
In contrast, the ATRC jurisdiction begins with an ex parte application.96 If  the ATRC 
judge determines there is probable cause, the alien is taken into custody and adjudication begins 
expeditiously.97 The ATRC has no backlog for calendaring a removal hearing, and suspects are 
unable to apply for ancillary relief.98 Without ancillary relief, the removal proceeding addresses just 
the merits of  the alien’s removability.99 Although available in the ATRC, release pending removal is 
not available to non-LPR suspects.100 Therefore, at least for non-LPRs terrorist suspects, the ATRC 
prevents terrorist suspects from being released in the country pending removal.101 
The ATRC’s appeals process is also more streamlined than that of  immigration courts. In 
immigration court, if  a party wants to appeal a decision, the party must first appeal to the Board 
of  Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).102 After the BIA, a federal circuit court can review the BIA 
decision.103 Only after the case survives scrutiny at those two levels may the parties seek review by 
the Supreme Court.104 Considering the current backlog and three levels of  prior review, a removal 
case originating from an immigration court can take a decade to clear all the levels of  review. If  
bond is granted, a suspected terrorist is allowed to remain out of  custody that entire time.
Appeal exhaustion with ATRC cases takes considerably less time.105 After the ATRC removal 
92  See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19, 1003.47 (2014).
93  See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (2014) (noting also that terrorism allegations could prevent bond).
94  The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (“TRAC”) at Syracuse University keeps records detailing the 
backlog in the U.S. Immigration Courts. TRAC also tracks various categories of  cases that the immigration courts 
presided over on year-to-year bases. Some of  the number as of  March 2015 include: 431,468 pending immigration cases; 
594 days nationwide average wait time for a hearing; and 23,995 cases involving criminal violations, national security, or 
terrorism. In fiscal year 2013, there were 192,736 deportation proceedings in immigration courts. Just fifty of  those cases 
had a nexus to national security or terrorism. The rest of  the proceedings involved immigration issues. See also Immigration 
Court Backlog Tool Pending Cases and Length of  Wait in Immigration Courts, transaCtional reCords aCCess Clearinghouse, 
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog (last visited Apr. 16, 2015).
95  See Amy Taxin, Shutdown Delayed More Than 37,000 Immigration Court Dates By Months
Overburdened System Has No Slack For Rescheduling, the Columbian (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.columbian.com/
news/2014/feb/22/shutdown-delayed-immigration-court-dates-by-months (citing Hon. Dana Leigh Marks of  San 
Francisco’s immigration court as not having an opening on her calendar for merit hearings until June 2017).
96  See 8 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(2) (2012).
97  Id.
98  Id.
99  See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e) (2012).
100  See 8 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(2) (2012).
101  Id.
102  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(a) (2014); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2014).
103  See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(2) (2012) (“The petition for review shall be filed with the court of  appeals for the 
judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed the proceedings.”).
104  See generally Kucana v. Holder, 130 S.Ct. 827 (2010).
105  See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(1) (2012).
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decision, there is no appeal to the BIA;106 instead, any appeal goes to the D.C. Circuit.107 From there, 
the Supreme Court may be petitioned, and, even if  the Supreme Court reviews the case, the Court 
only has two lower court decisions with zero ancillary relief  issues to look at.108 As such, an ATRC 
case can exhaust all levels of  appeal in less than one year. 
In short, the ATRC statutory framework makes it possible to deport a suspected terrorist in 
a short amount of  time and keep suspected terrorists off  the streets pending their removal. 
The next section uses an actual terrorism plot to demonstrate the ATRC’s counterterrorism 
utility. B. the meZer Case
 To illustrate the ATRC counterterrorism prowess, consider the case of  Ghazi Ibrahim Abu 
Mezer (“Mezer”).109 Mezer and his cohort Lafi Khalil (“Khalil”) were arrested in their Brooklyn 
apartment on July 31, 1997, for planning to bomb the New York City subway system.110 After 
Mezer’s arrest, authorities learned Mezer and Khahlil were Palestinians, and were illegally present in 
the U.S.111 Authorities also discovered Mezer was already in deportation proceedings in immigration 
court, and was out on bond while the proceedings were pending.112 
While out on bond, Mezer filed a political asylum application, i.e., ancillary relief, with 
the immigration court.113 In the application, he claimed to fear persecution if  returned to Israeli 
authorities because they believed he was a member of  the terrorist organization Hamas114 Mezer 
submitted the asylum claim three months before his arrest,115 and managed to delay the asylum 
hearing by moving for a change of  venue to New York (the target city for his bombing plot).116
 Based on these facts, all the requirements for ATRC jurisdiction were present. First, 
Mezer was clearly an alien because he was placed in removal proceedings.117 Second, Mezer’s ties 
to the terrorist organization Hamas establish the requisite national security justification.118 Third, 
the government likely either had or could have reached out to Israeli counterparts for classified 
information about Mezer.119 Therefore, the ATRC could have been invoked for Mezer’s deportation.
106  See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1535 (2012).
107  This is an interesting prospect, because, currently, the D.C. Circuit does not review BIA decisions or have a body 
of  immigration case law. This is because the Arlington Immigration Court handles immigration cases that originated in 
the District of  Columbia, and the Arlington Immigration Court sits geographically in the Fourth Circuit. See § 1252(b)
(2).
108  See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(k)(1) (2012).
109  See Bombs in Brooklyn: How the Two Illegal Aliens Arrested for Plotting to Bomb the New York Subway Entered and Remained 
in the United States, u.s. dep’t of JustiCe (Mar. 1998), http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/9803.
110  Id.
111  See id. (explaining that Mezer had been arrested three times in the previous thirteen months attempting to enter 
the United States illegally from Canada–the first two times he returned voluntarily to Canada).
112  Id.
113  See id.
114  See id. (adding that Khalil was also in the United States illegally, having entered on a tourist visa but having 
remained here after the visa expired).
115  Id.
116  Id.
117  Id.
118  See id. (describing several instances where the government failed to identify Mezer’s terrorist connections, but 
those failures are beyond the scope of  this article).
119  See generally id. (noting that the State Department normally does not perform specific checks on an individual’s 
associations with terrorism absent a request to do so).
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Had the case originated in the ATRC, the government could have removed Mezer from the 
country several months before his arrest date.120 The ATRC proceeding would have been fast and 
efficient for several reasons. First, Mezer was not an LPR and was thus ineligible for bond while his 
case was pending in the ATRC,121meaning that Mezer would have been detained from the time he 
was placed in removal proceedings until he was ultimately deported.122 Second, his political asylum 
claim is not an option in the ATRC.123 As such, Mezer could not delay his removal by forcing the 
court to hold a merits hearing on an ancillary issue.124 Finally, Mezer could not have changed venues, 
because there is only one ATRC court.125 Therefore, ATRC rules would have prevented Mezer from 
both relocating to New York and carrying out his bombing plot. 
Consistent with the Capone approach, if  Mezer’s removal case had been brought in the 
ATRC rather than the immigration court, the government would have prevented a planned subway 
bombing.126 Moreover, the ATRC framework would have allowed the government to detain Mezer 
for an indeterminate detention if  no country was willing to accept him.127 Therefore, the ATRC’s 
utility as a counterterrorism device is twofold:  first, as a speedy and efficient process to remove alien 
terrorists from the U.S., and second, as a means of  detaining a suspected terrorist on an immigration 
charge thereby preventing possible harm to the country and its citizens. Put simply, the government 
should use the ATRC as a counterterrorism tool.128 
The next part discusses the ATRC’s usefulness beyond being a counterterrorism tool. 
iii. Criminal proseCution of terrorists
Prosecuting terrorists is important for many reasons. Two reasons relevant to this discussion 
are as follows:  (1) under a system that respects the rule of  law, crimes committed must be punished; 
and (2) successful terrorist prosecution can prevent future terrorist acts and harms to U.S. nationals.  
Nonetheless, the U.S. criminal justice system did not develop to prosecute terrorists; it developed to 
prosecute crimes committed domestically. 
Because the U.S. criminal justice system primarily prosecutes cases against its own 
nationals, the U.S. system has developed rules and procedures that protect defendants based on the 
Constitution. Some well-known protections include, but are not limited to, the following:  the right 
to confront witnesses, the exclusion of  hearsay evidence and evidence obtained through coercion, 
the right to self-representation, the right to a trial by a jury of  one’s peers, and the right to be 
represented by an attorney.129 Moreover, defendants are entitled to discover any exculpatory evidence 
in the government’s possession.130 Once a government witness testifies on direct examination, 
statements or reports about the witness or prospective witness must be turned over to the 
120  See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(k)(1) (2012).
121  See 8 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)(A) (2012).
122  See, e.g., id. § 1534(i) (2012).
123  See id. § 1534(k).
124  See id.
125  See 8 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (2012).
126  See bJelopera, supra note 85 (remembering that, in this case, the government received a fortuitously timed tip that 
enabled them to foil the subway-bombing plot).
127  See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1537 (2012).
128   See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1534(k)(1) (2012).
129  See u.s. Const. amends.  v-vi.
130  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 91 (1963); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1) (requiring the government to 
provide defendants with: [1] their oral statements; [2] written statements made by the defendant that are within the 
government’s possession, custody, or control; [3] written records containing the substance of  statements made by the 
defendant; and [4] the defendant’s testimony before a grand jury).
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defendant.131 
Notwithstanding the above, when it comes to terrorist prosecutions, legitimate and common 
sense reasons counsel against employing these protections and procedure rules.132 The following 
discussion identifies three areas of  concern when prosecuting terrorist suspects in criminal courts 
and points out how the ATRC statutory framework provides solutions for each concern:  (A) 
Classified Evidence, (B) Evidence Exclusionary Rule Concerns, and (C) Due Process Checks.
A. Classified evidenCe
The L.A. Eight case highlights the fact that it is sometimes necessary to use classified 
information in proceedings against terrorist suspects.133 Like pre-1996 deportation cases, the 
government had to turn over classified information it intended to use during a criminal prosecution 
to defendants.134 Defendants often tried to force that situation in a strategy colloquially called “grey 
mail.”135 Congress tackled the grey mail problem by enacting the Classified Information Procedures 
Act (“CIPA”).136 Importantly, CIPA does not prevent the discovery or use of  classified information 
in criminal cases.137 Rather, it was designed to allow the government to make an informed decision 
about the effect a particular prosecution might have on national security before impanelling a 
jury.138 CIPA only allows the government to ask the Court to permit substitutions, admissions, or 
summaries of  the classified information before the trial commences.139 If  the Court denies the 
government’s requests, the government can decide to proceed with the case to trial, which would 
require turning over the classified information to the defendant; or dismiss certain charges, which 
might mitigate amount of  classified information disclosed; or dismiss the case without revealing 
classified information.140
However, in the terrorism prosecution context, scholars agree that national security risk 
131  See Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (b) (2012) (imposing discovery obligations on the “United States” generally, 
untethered to any one governmental entity. The Act requires information to be turned over to the defendant if  there 
has been a witness statement, if  the United States possesses the statement and if  the statement relates to the witness’s 
testimony at trial).
132  See id. 
133  See Henry Weinstein, Final Two L.A. 8 Defendants Cleared, l.a. times, Nov. 1, 2007, http://articles.latimes.
com/2007/nov/01/local/me-palestinian1.
134  See generally id.
135  See generally Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 11 n. 4 (defining “Grey mail” as a defense tactic usually available 
to government employees connected to national security. When charged with a crime, the defendant claims classified 
records are necessary for the defense. The goal is to request so many classified documents that the federal government 
says “no.” Then, the defense tries to convince a judge that they cannot get a fair trial without these records. If  the tactic 
is successful, the case or charges are dismissed).
136  CIPA, Pub.L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. app. 3 (2006)).
137  See United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 454-55 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Moussaoui, 65 F. App’x 
881, 887 (4th Cir. 2003) (“CIPA alone cannot justify the sealing of  oral argument and pleadings.”); see also United States v. 
Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[CIPA] creates no new rights of  or limits on discovery.”).
138  See Afsheen John Radsan, Remodeling the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 32 CardoZo l. rev. 437, 
447 (2010) (explaining that, prior to CIPA, before admissibility was determined during the course of  a public trial, 
prosecutors had to predict: [1] what classified information the accused might seek to disclose, [2] whether the court 
would rule it admissible, and [3] whether it would be leaked); see also CIPA § 5 (requiring defendants to notify the 
government of  any classified information the defendant “reasonably expects to disclose . . . in any manner in connection 
with any trial or pretrial proceeding”).
139  CIPA § 6(c)(1).
140  See id.
13Combating terrorism Vol. 5, No. 2
is higher than in domestic criminal violation cases, and the CIPA does not do enough to protect 
classified evidence.141 Under the CIPA, terrorist suspects are still able to gain access to classified 
intelligence through discovery or during trial testimony.142 Such access can expose sources of  
intelligence and national security information to terrorist groups.143
In a piece published in the New York Times, Michael B. Mukasey demonstrated two instances 
where classified intelligence was unintentionally revealed to terrorists during criminal prosecutions. 
144 The first instance was the case of  Omar Abdel Rahman for his role in the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing.145 In the Rahman case, the government turned over a list of  unindicted co-
conspirators to the defendants.146 Osama Bin Laden was on the list, and within ten days, a copy of  
the list reached Bin Laden.147  He thereby learned the United States was aware of  his and his co-
conspirators’ connection to the World Trade Center bombing.148 
The second instance was the case of  Ramzi Yousef  (hereinafter “Yousef  case”), the so-
called “mastermind” of  the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.149 During public testimony, a 
witness’s comment about a cell phone battery somehow tipped off  terrorists monitoring the trial 
that one of  their communication links was compromised.150 The terrorist group shut down that 
phone immediately, which had in fact been under U.S. surveillance and provided valuable intelligence 
in the past.151 The government lost that source of  intelligence permanently, along with any 
information that intelligence source may have revealed related to future attacks.152
These instances underscore conceivable risks to national security during a terrorist 
prosecution. However, the ATRC framework provides solutions for these two situations. In the 
Rahman case, the ATRC framework would have prevented him from discovering the list of  co-
conspirators and subsequently leaking that list to Bin Laden.153 Under the ATRC, Rahman would 
be allowed only to receive a summary of  classified information without the specific names of  each 
alleged co-conspirator.154 As for the Yousef  case, the ATRC statutory framework gives the judge 
discretion to conduct witness testimony in camera.155 As such, Yousef  and those monitoring the 
courtroom would be unable to hear the comment about the cell phone battery.156 
141  See, e.g., Radsan, supra note 138, at 451 (arguing that CIPA only offers a partial solution to the classified evidence 
dilemma because it still requires the government to make a decision between prosecuting with some disclosure and 
dismissing the case to avoid any more disclosure); see also Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 12.
142  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a).
143  See generally id.
144  Michael B. Mukasey, José Padilla Makes Bad Law, wall st. J., Aug. 22, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB118773278963904523.
145  See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that Abdel Rahman was a blind sheik who 
led a conspiracy to perform jihad against the United States).
146  See Mukasey, supra note 144.
147   Id.
148  Id.
149  See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 79 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that in 1993, Yousef  drove a van packed with 
explosives into the basement of  the World Trade Center, set a timer to detonate, and escaped before the bomb exploded. 
He killed six people, injured over a thousand people, and cause more than $500 million in property damage).
150  See Mukasey, supra note 144.
151  Id.
152  Id.
153  Id.
154  See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 14 (recognizing that defendants counter classified evidence through a 
special advocate who keeps the defendants appraised of  the situation).
155  See Niles, supra note 18 (saying that judges have significant leeway when deciding what information to review).
156  See id. at 1841 (making clear that aliens are allowed access to non-sensitive evidence and witnesses, but that they 
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Furthermore, under the ATRC’s LPR protections, Yousef ’s interest would have been 
protected.157 The LPR protections require a suspect’s special attorney advocate to be present at in 
camera hearings.158 That special attorney could contest the testimony on Yousef ’s behalf  without 
exposing that testimony to terrorists monitoring the case.159 Indeed, the special advocate protection 
is akin to cross-examination—albeit by a surrogate.160 Professor Amos Guiora proposed a similar 
solution in his article advancing proposals for a terrorist prosecution forum; he suggested, “[T]he 
intelligence information would be presented in camera by the prosecutor and . . . would be subject to 
rigorous cross-examination.”161 That is precisely what the ATRC framework provides.162 
Therefore, had Rahman’s and Yousef ’s prosecutions occurred under the ATRC statutory 
framework, national security information and an intelligence source would have been protected. 
In other words, the ATRC statutory framework takes CIPA a step further because the scheme 
prevents terrorist suspects from receiving any national security information whatsoever and prevents 
disclosures of  national security information during trial.163
a. evidenCe exClusionary rule ConCerns
In terrorism cases, sometimes the most reliable evidence available can be excluded from 
trial based on evidentiary exclusion rules in criminal court.164 Evidence exclusion rules evolved to 
protect defendants from coercion and other abusive conduct that potentially violate constitutionally 
guaranteed rights by law enforcement.165 However, government or foreign personnel--that are clearly 
not law enforcement--largely gather the evidence in terrorism cases.166 
Indeed, intelligence gathering agencies or the military, which use fundamentally different 
methods and have fundamentally different objectives than traditional law enforcement investigations, 
usually obtain terrorist prosecution evidence.167 The goal of  intelligence gathering is to collect 
information in order to prevent future harms.168 In contrast, the goal of  a criminal investigation are 
to preserve evidence, to protect the integrity of  information gathered, and ultimately to ensure a fair 
are not afforded the same privilege with classified information).
157  See id. at 1840-41.
158  This proposition assumes that the Lawful Permanent Resident (“LPR”) protections would apply to all defendants. 
That consideration is discussed in more detail infra at Part IV(D).
159  See Niles, supra note 18, at 1840.
160  See generally id. at 1841 (acknowledging that an alien is allowed to cross-examine non-secret witnesses, and it 
supports the inference that when the alien is unable to do so due to sensitivity issues, the alien’s authorized special 
advocate will do so on the alien’s behalf).
161 Amos N. Guiora & John T. Parry, Light at the End of  the Pipeline?: Choosing A Forum for Suspected Terrorists, 156 u. pa. 
l. rev. 356, 361 (2008). 
162  See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 14 (noting that although the defendant is not allowed to directly 
participate in the cross-examination when sensitive material is being discussed, the defendant’s special advocate will 
advocate the defendant’s position as rigorously as possible).
163  Id. 
164  See id. at 18 (stating that evidence gathering procedures in terrorism cases often do not comply with Federal 
Criminal Evidence requirements, so the ATRC provides a statutory framework to rectify this shortcoming).
165  See generally id. (allowing the inference that normal evidence gathering procedures are rigorous in order to fully 
protect a defendant’s constitutional rights).
166  See id. (stating that U.S. military personnel often conduct investigations on terrorism suspects).  
167  See id. (highlighting the difference between purpose of  collecting evidence by traditional law enforcement and 
intelligence organizations, specifically that law enforcement attempts to be proactive while intelligence gathering is 
usually reactive). 
168  Id.
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trial based on the evidence.169 Therefore, inevitably, evidence gathered by intelligence forces against 
terrorism suspects fails to satisfy rules developed to preserve the integrity of  evidence for domestic 
criminal prosecutions.170
Because there is little to no law enforcement involvement, it makes little sense to apply 
exclusion rules designed to protect defendants against law enforcement coercion or abuse. 
Admissibility of  hearsay, statements given without Miranda warnings, 171 and chain of  custody are 
areas where discussants suggest court rules should be relaxed for terrorism cases.172
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement, i.e., a verbal or nonverbal assertion, made by a 
declarant, and offered into evidence for the truth of  the matter asserted.173 Hearsay is generally 
inadmissible subject to exceptions because the evidence is deemed unreliable.174 Inadmissibility of  
hearsay in terrorism trials is problematic for three reasons. 
First, statements the government wants to use against terrorists are almost always hearsay.175 
Specifically, the statements were obtained for intelligence purposes out of  court, and there is no 
applicable exception to admit them.176 Second, the information sometimes comes from foreign 
intelligence sources unable or unwilling to testify at trial.177 Without the source’s testimony, 
statements (or evidence of  conduct—e.g., video surveillance or other recording) would fail to meet 
the Crawford standard.178 Third, foreign evidence collection procedures often do not comply with U.S. 
court standards, which makes it difficult to introduce statements obtained under those conditions.179 
Despite the status of  intelligence evidence as hearsay, that evidence should not be excluded 
because it is the most reliable evidence available against a terrorism suspect.180 Yet, under traditional 
exclusionary rules, the hearsay would be excluded in criminal courts.181
Miranda warnings are problematic for different reasons. During the course of  an intelligence 
gathering operation, terrorist suspects that are interviewed are not given Miranda warnings because 
their statements are elicited to get intelligence.182 In contrast, when U.S. law enforcement questions 
a criminal suspect, the suspect is given Miranda warnings before an interrogation because that 
information is intended to be used for the suspect’s prosecution.183 The suspect can then invoke 
169  See id. (reiterating that in criminal law there are highly detailed and particular methods that were developed in order 
to protect the integrity of  the evidence and ensure that it is admissible during trial).
170  See id. at 24 (stating that when intelligence agencies, both foreign and domestic, gather evidence, they often do not 
comply with domestic court standards).
171  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
172  See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 25-26 (paraphrasing an ABA panel discussion where discussants 
suggested that Article III courts should admit all plausible evidence).
173  Fed. R. Evid. 801(a)-(c).
174  See id. at 802.
175  See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 18 (noting that evidence collected by the intelligence community is often 
hearsay).
176  See id. at 24 (discussing the recognized exceptions in terrorism cases for admitting normally inadmissible evidence, 
and reminding the reader that the exceptions are finite).
177  See id.
178  See id.; see generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
179  See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 24.
180  See id. (supporting the idea that the primary reason for evidentiary exclusions with regard to hearsay is because it 
is common and reliable).  
181  See id.
182  See id. at 21 (arguing that even though intelligence gathering on the battlefield is not done for evidentiary 
purposes, it may be useful to give those being questioned some form of  Miranda warning in order to preserve the 
integrity of  the information being gathered).
183  See id. at 20 (stating that the United States requires the suspect be administered Miranda warnings if  the evidence 
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the right to remain silent or the right to an attorney, and the interrogation must cease.184 Of  course, 
Miranda can be waived.185 
Most important, the purpose of  the Miranda warning is to protect a suspect from law 
enforcement coercion.186 That rationale does not hold water when a suspect is apprehended on 
the battlefield or under exigent circumstances. It is pointless to warn a suspect of  his or right to an 
attorney or right to remain silent on the battlefield. Indeed, exigent circumstances may require the 
suspect’s immediate interrogation to prevent imminent harm.187 Likewise, there is no way to predict 
that a suspect is going to be tried in a U.S. court if  found in a foreign country. In those situations, it 
is impractical to pause and warn the suspect of  his or her Miranda rights.188 Nevertheless, successful 
Miranda challenges result in statements being suppressed.189 
Another evidentiary hurdle with terrorist persecutions in criminal court is the chain of  
custody required for admitting evidence during trial.190 The Federal Rules have specific requirements 
to ensure the authenticity of  evidence for use in prosecutions known as the “chain of  evidence.”191 
Scholars acknowledge when attempting to prosecute terrorists the burden of  the chain of  custody 
are unfeasible and often impossible.192 Having a member of  the military travel from the battlefield 
to the Court in order to authenticate evidence or testify to the chain of  evidence undermines 
national security interests on the battlefield.193 One can also imagine a situation where an intelligence 
source, like a terrorist cell phone, provides evidence that the government is unwilling to expose in 
the process of  authenticating the exhibit for trial.  Nevertheless, just because the government does 
not want to reveal the source of  evidence does not mean the evidence itself  is unreliable. Similarly, 
just because a military service member cannot testify in court about the chain of  custody of  the 
evidence does not mean the evidence is unreliable. 
As indicated, evidentiary exclusion rules exist to protect the defendant from improper law 
enforcement practices and prevent police abuses.194 The same logic falls short for situations where 
evidence is gathered under the rules of  war or for intelligence purposes, like preventing a future 
attack.195 The military is not law enforcement.196 Yet, the military is often called upon to gather 
evidence used to prosecute terrorist suspects.197 In short, the rationale for the hearsay, Miranda, and 
gained through an interrogation is to be allowed at trial).
184  Id.
185  See Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980) (recognizing that the burden to establish that a defendant knowingly 
and intelligently waived the rights protected by Miranda rests on the state).
186  See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 20.
187  See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984) (acknowledging a public safety exception to the Miranda 
requirement). 
188  See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 21(agreeing that Miranda warnings on the battlefield would be 
impractical).
189  See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306–07 (1985) (recognizing failure to administer Miranda warnings creates a 
presumption of  compulsion, which if  not rebutted, means that the statements are excluded from evidence.  Conversely, 
if  a suspect claims that statements were elicited by torture, it may be unfair to use the statements at trial).
190  See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 25.
191  Id.  
192  Id.
193  See id. 
194  See id. at 20 (discussing how failure to administer Miranda warnings to terrorist suspects can preclude the 
information from being allowed in court, thus helping the defendant).
195  See id. at 18.
196  See The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012) (prohibiting the use of  the military for law enforcement 
purposes). 
197  See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 18-19 (suggesting that due to the unique role of  the military they often 
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chain of  custody exclusionary rules is not rational for evidence in terrorism prosecution cases.198 
These rules hinder terrorism prosecutions.
The ATRC statutory framework provides a solution to the exclusion problems in terrorism 
cases.199 All of  the evidentiary rules for criminal prosecutions in federal court are contained in the 
Federal Rules of  Evidence.200 Therefore, to avoid evidentiary exclusions, one need only make the 
Federal Rules of  Evidence inapplicable in the terrorist prosecution forum.201 Instead, a judge should 
determine whether the information is reliable enough to admit into evidence. This is in fact how 
evidence submission takes place in the ATRC.202 The ATRC’s statutory framework explicitly states 
that the Federal Rules of  Evidence do not apply.203 As such, issues of  hearsay, Miranda warnings, and 
chain of  custody are irrelevant in proceedings before that ATRC.204 Therefore, if  a terrorism case 
were in the ATRC, hearsay, Miranda, and chain of  evidence are all nonstarters.205 Put differently, the 
ATRC statutory framework resolves exclusionary rule hurdles to prosecuting terrorist suspects in 
domestic criminal courts.
b. due proCess CheCKs
One foundational element in implementing legislation pertains to fairness, despite any 
emotional biases, because “[w]e know that even if  logic dictates doing things one way, we need to 
do it a different way in order to be what we want to be as a people.”206 In other words, a terrorist 
prosecution forum must afford a suspect protection and rights so the proceedings are legitimate. 
A terrorism prosecution forum cannot be one sided in favor of  the government or else it will be 
perceived as unfair. Therefore, an ideal terrorism prosecution forum will satisfy concepts of  justice, 
evenhandedness, and due process. Americans are uncomfortable with the possibility of  detaining the 
wrong person and are also uncomfortable with trial results that appear to lack integrity.207 
To that end, the ATRC framework safeguards suspects in several ways. First, the ATRC 
requires a high-ranking government official to certify that national security information is evidence 
against a terrorist.208 Also, the ATRC guarantees an Article III judge will review classified evidence to 
ensure that a defendant is able to put on a defense.209 In fact, a former Chief  Assistant U.S. Attorney, 
Andrew McCarthy, recommended using Article III judges as a way of  maintaining fairness.210 He 
encounter and collect evidence on terrorist suspects before law enforcement agencies get involved).
198  See id. at 19 (arguing that the goals for intelligence gathering operations are different than those for law 
enforcement, and that the evidentiary rules should not be the same).
199  See generally id. (discussing the importance of  the ATRC in creating ways around normal evidentiary standards).
200  See id. at 23.
201  See generally id. at 18-19 (arguing that as long as the Federal Rules of  Evidence are not applicable to military 
intelligence gathering or terrorist prosecutions, the traditional evidentiary rules do not apply).
202  Id. at 28. 
203  8 U.S.C. § 1534 (h).
204  Id.
205  Id.
206  Andrew C. McCarthy, A Case for a National Security Court, 57 wayne l. rev. 275 (2011).
207  See W. Dudley McCarter, Juror Nondisclosure, 55 J. mo. b. 214, 216 (1999); see generally State v. Dett, 891 A.2d 1113 
(2006).
208  8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(1)(c) (2012).
209  Indeed, Article III judges are key to a suspect’s protection in the ATRC. Article III judges are familiar with 
criminal cases and are equipped to understand the type of  information a defendant needs to make a defense. This is 
particularly relevant to the classified evidence summaries because the judge determines whether the summary is adequate 
to make a defense.
210  See McCarthy, supra note 206, at 279–80.
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hypothesized that allowing Article III judges to administer cases under rules that protect intelligence 
information would sufficiently operate as an “independent judicial check” on the executive branch, 
ensuring the proceedings are not a rubber stamp or sham. 211
In addition, ATRC proceedings foster public participation in the process by requiring 
proceedings to be open to the public.212 This element provides transparency and keeps prosecutors 
honest.213 Terrorist suspects also benefit from no cost advocacy and prior notice before an ATRC 
proceeding commences.214 Therefore, like traditional criminal proceedings, a terrorist suspect tried in 
the ATRC has the right to an attorney at no cost, is informed of  the allegations against him, and has 
an opportunity to present a defense.215
A terrorist suspect is even protected during in camera sessions.216 A suspect has an advocate 
present to contest testimony or evidence on the suspect’s behalf  during all in camera sessions.217 
Importantly, although the terrorist suspect does not see any classified evidence, his or her advocate 
does.218 Therefore, a suspect’s defense team does get all the evidence in its original form.219
Finally, a terrorist suspect has the additional protection and right to appellate review of  
decisions at all stages of  the proceeding.220 So, if  the ATRC judge errs or the evidence is insufficient 
to sustain the claims, the suspect can bring that argument before an appellate tribunal.221
In short, the ATRC statutory framework provides due process checks that legitimize terrorist 
prosecution in that court. The framework is therefore ideal for resolving the struggles prosecutors 
currently face when prosecuting terrorist suspects in criminal courts. However, the ATRC statutory 
framework does have its limits. 
The next part proposes changes to the ATRC’s statutory framework to make the ATRC a 
forum capable of  adjudicating terrorism cases.
iv. transforming the atrC
As enacted, the ATRC is an incomplete terrorism prosecution forum because it lacks 
necessary authorities to adjudicate criminal proceedings.222 The ATRC is, after all, structured as an 
alien deportation court.223 However, because Congress already equipped the ATRC for overseeing 
terrorism cases and providing protections to terrorist suspects, only minor amendments are needed 
to transform the ATRC into an effective prosecution forum. The following proposals will give 
211  Id.
212  See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(2) (2012).
213  See generally Public Right of  Access to Criminal Trials: Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 94 harv. l. rev. 149 (1980).
214  See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(b), (c) (2012).
215  See id. § 1534 (a)-(c).
216  See id. § 1534 (f).
217  See id. § 1534 (e)(3)(F).
218  See id. § 1534 (e)(3)(A).
219  See id. § 1534 (c).
220  At the application stage, the defendant can seek review by the D.C. Circuit if  they are not provided a summary, and, 
when the case is decided, that decision is subject to review by the D.C. Circuit. Ultimately, the Supreme Court may even 
grant certiorari. 
221  See 8 U.S.C § 1535 (c)(4)(D) (2012).
222  See 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6) (2012) (allowing for certifications by the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, an executive branch official or officials designated by the President from among those executive officers employed in 
the area of  national security or defense and appointed by the President with the advice and consent of  the Senate, or the 
Deputy Director of  the Federal Bureau of  Investigation)  
223  Emily C. Kendall, The Alien Terrorist Removal Court and Other National Security Measures You May Have Never Heard of: 
The Need for Comprehensive National Security Reform, 18 tex. wesleyan l. rev. 253, 269 (2011).
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the ATRC necessary powers, authority, and jurisdiction to be a viable forum for both terrorism 
prosecutions and terrorist removal.
a. amend CertifiCation requirement
The ATRC’s application and certification process should be amended so the ATRC 
jurisdiction can be invoked at the local and regional levels. Currently, the ATRC requires the 
Attorney General to certify all ATRC removal proceeding applications.224 Although requiring 
certification helps ensure the ATRC hears only the most serious national security cases, in practice 
this certification is difficult for regional government entities to obtain.225
In 2008, Congress modified a similar certification provision in the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, to give local and regional office level supervisors authority to certify applications 
for the FISC.226 Such amendment is practical and necessary to make the ATRC function for 
terrorism prosecution or removal. 
Indeed, post-9/11 the ATRC application and certification process is more complicated for 
two reasons. First, since 2003, the Department of  Homeland Security (“DHS”), as opposed to the 
DOJ, is responsible for initiating deportation proceedings against aliens.227 Second, cross department 
certification is impractical.228 Even assuming the authority to certify an ATRC application has passed 
to the Secretary of  DHS, which is not at all clear, it is inefficient for each satellite DHS office to ask 
headquarters to certify each case.229 As such, the application and certification authority should be 
amended to extend or delegate application certification ability to supervisors at local offices. Also, 
it would be prudent for the amendment to clarify which agency is responsible for bringing cases 
before the ATRC.
b. expand the Court’s JurisdiCtion
The ATRC’s jurisdiction needs to be expanded in order to adjudicate criminal cases. 
Presently, the ATRC has jurisdiction over aliens when national security information is used or a 
likelihood of  severe harm is present.230 The ATRC has no personal jurisdiction over U.S. citizens and 
224  See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a).
225  Leslie A. Holman, The Impact of  September 11th on America’s Immigration Laws, Policy, and Procedures, 27-DEC vt. 
b.J. 17, 19 (2001) (noting that specifically, the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General (there is no power 
of  delegation) may certify an alien as a terrorist if  reasonable grounds exist to believe the alien is a terrorist or has 
committed a terrorist activity).
226  See 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6) (2012) (allowing for certifications by the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, an executive branch official or officials designated by the President from among those executive officers employed in 
the area of  national security or defense and appointed by the President with the advice and consent of  the Senate, or the 
Deputy Director of  the Federal Bureau of  Investigation).
227  See Homeland Security Act of  2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 441, 116 Stat. 2192 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 251 (2006)) 
(transferring the functions of  the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“Service” or “INS”) to the Department of  
Homeland Security (“DHS”), and retaining in the Department of  Justice under the direction of  the Attorney General 
the functions of  the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”)).
228  Id. 
229  See About ICE: Office of  Principle Legal Advisor, http://www.ice.gov/about/offices/leadership/opla/ (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2015) (explaining that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Office of  the Principal Legal 
Advisor (“OPLA”) is the exclusive legal representative for the U.S. government in exclusion, deportation, and removal 
proceedings before the immigration courts.  Moreover, OPLA attorneys also litigate immigration related hearings that 
involve criminal aliens, terrorists, and human rights abusers).
230  See 8 U.S.C. § 1534 (e)(1)(c) (2012).
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the ATRC has no authority over violations of  criminal statutes.231 The Court’s personal jurisdiction 
is therefore inadequate for terrorism cases perpetrated by U.S. citizens. Even so, because it is 
reasonable to adjudicate all terrorism cases in the same forum, the ATRC’s personal jurisdiction 
should be amended to include all terrorist defendants regardless of  immigration status.
Additionally, the ATRC needs additional subject matter jurisdiction to be able to hear 
criminal terrorism cases. Existing ATRC authority limits subject matter jurisdiction to determining 
whether an alien is a terrorist for purpose of  deportation.232 However, terrorism prosecutions are 
based on violations of  federal criminal statutes.233 In this sense, the Court should be authorized to 
adjudicate federal terrorism crimes. 
Finally, the ATRC judges require additional disposition authority. Currently, the ATRC 
judge’s only disposition authority is deportation.234 If  the Court is to decide criminal matters, it must 
be able to impose criminal sentences upon successful convictions. Therefore, the ATRC statutory 
framework should be amended to allow ATRC judges to sentence convicted terrorists.
C. two standards of proof
The ATRC should have different standards of  proof  depending of  the subject matter of  the 
proceeding. In terrorist removal cases, the standard should remain at clear and convincing evidence. That 
standard makes sense because deportation is not a punishment or deprivation of  an alien’s liberty 
interest.235 Likewise, in camera hearings regarding classified and national security information can 
remain at the clear and convincing standard because such proceedings address only the admissibility 
of  evidence. However, the standard for criminal matters should be beyond a reasonable doubt to 
comply with the Constitution. In all criminal proceedings, a defendant is presumed innocent.236 
That presumption would make little sense without the higher standard of  proof  for criminal cases 
because a defendant’s liberty is ultimately at stake. 
D. extend lpr proteCtions to all defendants
The ATRC LPR protections are the most powerful protections available to a suspect 
provided by ATRC statutory framework. However, those protections are unavailable for all 
nonpermanent residents.237 Because liberty interests are at stake in a criminal case, ATRC LPR 
protections should be extended to all defendants regardless of  alien status.238 Doing so will assure 
the highest level of  due process available under the statute for criminal defendants tried in the 
ATRC. Having a special advocate on the defense team who is able to view all the classified evidence 
and contest that evidence balances out the minimization procedures the Court applies with respect 
to classified evidence.239 Giving such protection to all defendants adds a level of  legitimacy to the 
proceedings.
231  See 8 U.S.C. § 1531 (1) (2012); see 8 U.S.C. § 1534 (a)(1) (2012).
232  See 8 U.S.C. § 1534 (a)(1) (2012).
233  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339(B) (2012).
234  See Blum, supra note 3, at 1.
235  See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (“The order of  deportation is not a punishment for 
crime . . . . It is but a method of  enforcing the return to his own country of  an alien who has not complied with the 
conditions upon the performance of  which . . . his continuing to reside here shall depend.”).
236  See Coffin v. U.S., 156 U.S. 432, 454 (1895).
237  See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 761 (2008) (holding that aliens detained at the U.S. Naval Station in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have the constitutional privilege of  habeas corpus).   
238  See id. (suggesting that non-LPR aliens detained for terrorism prosecution should have constitutional protections).
239  See Inderfurth & Massey, supra note 8, at 14.
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E. hybrid Court
 With the amendments recommended above, the ATRC can function as a hybrid court. 
That is, the ATRC should be viable for seeking terrorist removal as well as terrorist prosecution. 
Since Erie v. Tompkins, federal courts apply state law and federal procedural rules simultaneously 
in the same court.240 Applying immigration law and criminal law in the same court is no different. 
Moreover, the ATRC federal judges are familiar with balancing a dual docket (civil and criminal).241 
Therefore, it should not be difficult for ATRC judges to manage both removal proceedings and 
criminal terrorism cases.
 Similar hybrid courts have been successful in the international context applying both 
domestic penal law and international law.242 The successful hybrid legal applications indicate the 
ATRC can do so as well. Moreover, if  an alien is subject to removal and suspected of  criminal 
terrorism, it conserves judicial resources to resolve both issues in the same proceeding. No doubt, 
many of  the issues would overlap. 
 Finally, DHS and DOJ attorneys are equipped to handle criminal and immigration matters 
when it involves an alien.243 Whichever agency represents the government in the ATRC,244 it should 
have little difficulty managing dual dockets.245 
F. name Change
This article’s final proposal is to give the transformed ATRC a new name. “Alien Terrorist 
Removal Court” does not encompass the hybrid jurisdiction of  the herein proposed terrorism court. 
The name “United States Homeland Security Court”246 could be one option. That name connotes 
aspects of  immigration and national security; practically speaking, immigration processing falls 
under the purview of  the DHS as they involve the security of  the homeland.247 Another option is 
simply “United States Terrorism Court,” a name that highlights the terrorism-centric aspect of  the 
Court. Whichever name, with the proposals above, the ATRC is a complete solution for prosecuting, 
deporting, and detaining terrorist suspects. 
ConClusion
It is a shame that the ATRC has sat unused for almost two decades.248 The ATRC’s powerful 
statutory authority makes it a mighty weapon against terrorist suspects, and an ideal forum for 
prosecuting terrorist suspects. Indeed, the ATRC’s statutory framework exemplifies a balance of  
national security considerations with due process of  law. The government should use the ATRC 
to combat terrorism and to prosecute terrorist suspects. The latter use takes some statutory 
240  See generally Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
241  See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012).
242  See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of  Hybrid Courts, 97 am. J. int’l l. 295, 295 (2003) (discussing hybrid 
domestic-international courts and the blending of  international and domestic laws in those courts).
243  See generally, 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a).
244  See id. 
245  See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012) (stating that DOJ attorneys also litigate in both immigration and criminal cases).
246  See Glenn M. Sulmasy, The Legal Landscape After Hamdan: The Creation of  Homeland Security Courts, 13 new eng. 
J. int’l & Comp. l. 1, 13 (2006) (proposing a “Homeland Security Court” using Article I judges to determine the 
lawfulness of  intelligence gathering, terrorist surveillance, and detention of  prisoners of  the Global War on Terror).
247  See Homeland Security Act of  2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 441, 116 Stat. 2192 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 251 (2006)).
248  See Andrew Becker, Terrorism Court Unused 16 Years After Creation, Cal. watCh (Apr. 12, 2012), http://
californiawatch.org/dailyreport/terrorist-court-unused-16-years-after-creation-14746.
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amendment, which is provided in this article.249 Nonetheless, activating the Court is prudent and 
follows precedent.250 In 2002, the FISA Review Court heard its first case two decades after its 
creation.251 Like the FISA Review Court, the ATRC’s twenty-year hibernation is up.
249  See supra Part IV.A.
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